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Abstract
This study applies stated-preference choice experiments and accompanying surveys to
examine how Subscription Video on Demand (SVoD) has disrupted film and televi-
sion consumption. We examine demand for a large set of traditional consumption
alternatives, such as cinema and free-to-air TV, as well as newer internet-based sub-
scription services, such as Netflix. We consider a range of alternative-specific product
attributes—including price, viewing quality, and release delay—that allow us to quan-
tify substitution effects and willingness-to-pay estimates. In addition, we also consider
illegal viewing alternatives, with associated attributes related to (potential) punish-
ment that inform on the efficacy of policy against digital piracy. Our primary results
reveal that while some traditional alternatives remain important, consumers derive sig-
nificant utility from SVoD, which provides a large surplus at current pricing. We also
observe that marginal effects and willingness-to-pay estimates are sensitive to ex-ante
interest in a film or TV series. Moreover, we provide evidence that consumers can be
segmented in relation to (survey-reported) piracy experience, as well as perceptions
of punishment risk and (industry) damage associated with piracy. We also find some
evidence that increasing punishment probability and fines may discourage illegal con-
sumption. Finally, we provide some validation of our results with a follow-up survey
conducted six months after the experiment.
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1 Introduction
The arrival of Netflix and, to a lesser extent, other Subscription Video on Demand (SVoD)
services has significantly disrupted traditional media industries with interests in film and
television. With SVoD increasing its global penetration, established pay-TV providers have
had to reconsider their business and pricing strategies to remain competitive. For example,
historic rivals Comcast and Netflix struck a deal in July 2016 to include Netflix in the
Comcast X1 set-top box. In March 2018, Europe’s Sky pay-TV announced a partnership
with Netflix in a bid to retain customers. In November 2014, Australian pay-TV provider
Foxtel halved the price of its basic subscription only months before Netflix’s arrival.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that digital piracy (both downloading and streaming)
has reduced as a direct result of SVoD alternatives. In 2013, Netflix Chief Content Officer Ted
Sarandos made the observation: “When we launch in a territory the Bittorrent traffic drops
as the Netflix traffic grows”.1 A number of surveys have also attributed decreased illegal
piracy levels to the arrival of Netflix. For example, a 2016 study by the UK Intellectual
Property Office related decreased piracy levels to the rising popularity of Netflix.2 Similar
evidence has been found in Australia by the Intellectual Property Awareness Foundation.3
While few would deny the existence of a SVoD substitution effect against the incumbent
providers (both legal and illegal), there have only been limited attempts to measure such
effects. In large part, this is likely due to the dearth of data that researchers have access
to on consumer activity in this space. Netflix is well known to be extremely protective of
its data and, with the exception of the theatrical film industry, sales data from downstream
content providers is also extremely difficult to access. Furthermore, obtaining reliable data
on illegal piracy presents its own set of challenges, not the least of which being that many
participants go to great lengths to conceal their activities.
Presented with these challenges, a revealed-preference analysis of consumer behaviour
in these industries is extremely difficult. This study attempts to make headway into this
area using laboratory-based stated-preference choice experiments as an alternate approach.
Specifically, we investigate how SVoD affects traditional legal and illegal alternatives. Fur-
thermore, our analysis also examines the efficacy of policy designed to curtail digital piracy.
We develop a framework in which consumers face choices over viewing alternatives of film
and TV, which (in addition to the important subjective differences) are defined by a com-
mon set of attributes related to price, viewing quality, and release delay. Within this set of
1Cited in Stuff interview on 1st May, 2013 (https://www.stuff.tv/news/).
2See https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/07/04/internet-piracy-falls-to-record-
lows-amid-rise-of-spotify-and-ne/.
3See https://www.businessinsider.com.au/australian-internet-piracy-drops-29-2015-10.
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alternatives, we also consider illegal viewing options, associated with additional attributes
related to potential punishment from this activity.
We estimate a variety of (related) discrete-choice models. Specifically, the multinomial
logit (MNL), mixed multinomial logit (MMNL), and latent class (LC) models. While the
MNL serves as a useful baseline model, it suffers from the well-known independence from
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. The MMNL model avoids this problem and allows
the estimation of more realistic substitution patterns and willingness-to-pay estimates, which
permit inferences concerning the introduction of SVoD. We also harness the properties of
the LC model to segment participants by observable characteristics, which further helps to
understand how SVoD has disrupted the traditional media landscape.
Our stated-preference design is also novel in two important respects. First, we prime
participants with a number of forthcoming film and TV series. For each respective title,
we ask whether they would be i) ‘highly likely’, ii) ‘fairly likely’, or iii) not likely to view
(default). This allows us compare substitution patterns and willingess-to-pay estimates
across alternatives for ex-ante different-valued products. Second, we employ the ‘availability
design’ methodology developed by Rose, Louviere and Bleimer (2013). As modern consumers
face a relatively large set of viewing alternatives for film and TV, this allows us to present
subsets of alternatives within an individual choice task, while maintaining an efficient global
design. This minimises the potential for ‘cognitively overburdening’ participants, which may
confound results when stated-preference choice tasks feature too many alternatives.
In addition to the stated-preference experiments, we utilise two distinct surveys to add
depth to our analysis. First, and immediately following the stated-preference exercise, we
conducted a ‘post-experiment survey’ of participants general viewing habits, attitudes to-
wards piracy, and demographic information. We use this additional data to segment par-
ticipants in the LC models. The second survey was conducted approximately six months
after the laboratory-based experiments (and ‘post experiment survey’). In this ‘follow-up
survey’ participants were presented with the same film and TV titles from the laboratory
experiments and asked if and how they actually viewed the various titles, of which almost
all had been released for at least a few months.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews literature related to our study.
Section 3 outlines relevant stated-preference theory and provides specific details concerning
our experimental design. In addition, this section describes the post-experiment and follow-
up surveys that compliment our analysis. Section 4 discusses results. In addition to the
MNL and MMNL model results, we report selected substitution effects and willingness-to-
pay estimates. We also report results from LC model and the follow-up survey. Finally,
Section 5 provides summary and concluding remarks.
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2 Literature
Our study contributes to a growing literature that considers the effects of digital disruption
in media industries. It is already relatively well established that illegal file sharing and online
piracy results in at least some displacement of legitimate sales (Rob and Waldfogel, 2007;
Hennig-Thurau, Henning, and Sattler, 2007; Bai and Waldfogel, 2012). As such, it should
come as little surprise that more recent studies find evidence of similar displacement effects
in the context of SVoD; both in terms of internet penetration leading to a reduction in time
spent watching conventional television (Liebowitz and Zentner, 2016), and to the reductions
in both legal and illegal forms of media consumption following the introduction of SVoD
services (Aguiar and Waldfogel, 2018a; Godinho de Matos, Ferriera, and Smith, 2017). This
displacement has been found to be particularly pronounced among low-income and younger
households, who are more likely to cut subscriptions to other paid television services in the
presence of SVoD services (Prince and Greenstein, 2017).
SVoD platforms such as Netflix, Hulu and Amazon Prime effectively constitute a type
of club good, potentially requiring special consideration to be given to appropriate price,
payment and revenue-sharing mechanisms compared with other forms of media consumption.
In terms of pricing, evidence of the elasticity of demand for movie products is mixed. For
example, Lang, Switzer and Swartz (2011) find evidence of relatively price inelastic demand
for home movie consumption via DVD, while De Roos and McKenzie (2014) find evidence of
relatively high price elasticity of demand at the cinema box office. Even among segments of
consumers, Mukherjee and Kadiyali (2011) find evidence that those with stronger preferences
for movies with higher theatrical revenues and advertising expenditures tend to be less price
sensitive than average. Given varying evidence on the price elasticity of demand in this
context, relatively simple strategies of price discrimination such as bundling and two-part
tariffs have been advocated in the literature (Shiller and Waldfogel, 2011; 2013).
SVoD services are also likely to impact upon patterns of consumption via the timing of
releases. Mukherjee and Kadiyali (2011) find evidence of low cross-channel availability elas-
ticities between movie purchases and rentals. The authors argue that so-called ‘windowing’
strategies, involving the staggering of movie release across various channels, are ineffective
since consumers prefer to watch older content on their preferred distribution channel rather
than change channel in order to access newer content. Indeed, a number of other studies (e.g.
Hiller, 2017; King and King, 2017) show that subscribers to SVoD services may be dispropor-
tionately likely to view older ‘catalogue’ titles compared with other forms of consumption,
largely due to SVoD services helping to overcome the search costs associated with locating
a movie over time. This pattern may also partly explain why consumers have been shown
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to be significantly more likely to view ‘niche’ titles as opposed to blockbusters via digital
distribution channels (Zentner, Smith and Kaya, 2013). Lang, Switzer and Swartz (2011)
further highlight that, while demand for home movie consumption is partly correlated with
both the production budget and the performance of the original theatrical release, it is also
comparatively less responsive to reviews from professional critics. SVoD services have also
been shown to increase the availability of titles from other countries and promote non-US
titles better than theatrical releases (Aguiar and Waldfogel, 2018b).
In the absence of comprehensive revealed preference data, studies investigating consumer
demand for entertainment goods have made use of stated preference methodologies based
around discrete choice and latent-class modelling. The aim of these approaches is to identify
different willingness to pay (WTP) for content among consumers for products with different
characteristics. A number of studies have employed these methodologies through surveying
attendees at European theatre events (Grisoĺıa and Willis, 2011; 2012; Baldin and Bille,
2018), highlighting how consumer preferences can be defined by characteristics such as age,
gender, income and cultural capital, as well as the characteristics of output such as genre,
timing of showing/release, critical reviews and word-of-mouth. To our knowledge, only
one study has previously applied a stated-preference approach in the context of online movie
streaming services, where consumer WTP is shown to be positively influenced by the amount
(volume) of content offered and the timing of its availability relative to original release, while
being negatively affected by the presence of advertisements and the sharing of non-identifying
personal information (Glasgow and Butler, 2017).
Our work also has relevance to the literature on digital piracy and the effectiveness of anti-
piracy policy. In theory, while Darmon and Le Texier (2016) argue that public enforcement
of anti-piracy rules may be socially optimal compared with private enforcement, they also
contend that supply-side policies may be counter-productive and damage social welfare. It
is therefore somewhat unsurprising that the effectiveness of government policies designed
to curtail piracy has been called into question by Orme (2014), who argues that very few
anti-piracy policies adopted by the US over the last twenty years have any effect upon movie
box office revenues. Those that are shown to have an effect are argued to ultimately harm
the business in the long-run due to the loss of associated word-of-mouth promotion.
Similar findings have been shown in relation to more recent supply-side policy responses,
such as the high profile shut-down of the popular ‘cyber locker’ site Megaupload.com. Al-
though there is evidence to suggest that commercial revenues for film products increased in
the wake of the Megaupload.com closure (Danaher and Smith, 2014), it has also been shown
that the closure benefited only wide-release movies and that the net effect of the policy has
been negative due to the loss of informational externalities created by file sharing (Peukert,
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Claussen and Kretschmer, 2017). Related results have also been shown in the case of mu-
sic streaming services, whereby the removal of material from video streaming site YouTube
is shown to increase album sales only among top-selling artists, whereas lesser-known acts
suffer due to the loss of a vital promotional channel (Hiller, 2016).
An increasingly popular policy to tackle piracy in many countries over the last few years
has been dubbed ‘graduated response’ due to the issue of warnings and sanctions of increas-
ing severity issued by ISPs to consumers found to be repeatedly pirating digital materials.
Danaher, Smith, Telang and Chen (2014) find evidence to suggest that the French graduated
response policy (known as ‘HADOPI’) has led to a significant increase in legitimate music
sales, especially among genres that are known to be more heavily affected by piracy. By con-
trast, a cross-country study by McKenzie (2017) finds no consistent evidence of any effect of
graduated response policies upon movie box office revenues, which may be a consequence of
the substitutability between the cinema experience and the illegal alternative.
In summary, the existing literature offers useful insight into the extent to which SVoD
services bring about displacement of consumption via other legal channels. The literature
also provides evidence of markedly different tastes and preferences among consumers in re-
lation to price, variety, genre and timing of releases, as well as among distinct segments of
consumers clustered according to age, gender, income, etc. In addition, there is inconsis-
tent evidence concerning how SVoD may displace illegal consumption, which is particularly
noteworthy given mixed evidence regarding the efficacy of supply-side policies. These issues
have important managerial implications for SVoD platforms in the presence of piracy. Addi-
tionally, given the increased quantity and variety of output offered by digitisation, our study
responds to a call for further research into the ways in which consumers identify suitable
outputs from the vast array offered by platform such as Netflix (Waldfogel, 2017).
3 Stated-preference choice experiments
To investigate our primary research question concerning how the arrival of SVoD has dis-
rupted established (legal and illegal) consumption of film and TV, as well as secondary
questions concerning the efficacy of policies designed to curb illegal consumption, we de-
velop a stated-preference choice experiment. This section begins by outlining basic theory
underpinning the stated-preference approach before describing the specific features of our
experimental design. A discussion regarding the selection of the film and TV alternatives
and their attributes then follows. Finally, we detail two additional surveys used to support
and help validate our stated-preference experiments.
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3.1 Stated-preference theory
As has been well documented, discrete-choice models are based on random utility theory
where a representative consumer’s utility is derived from the product attributes (or charac-
teristics), subject to some unobserved error term.4 It is well known that the standard multi-
nomial logit (MNL) model assumes that preferences are homogeneous/consistent across all
consumers. In the simple MNL model, the utility a representative consumer i derives from
alternative j can be expressed as Uij = αj + β
′Xj + εij, where αj is the alternative-specific
constant for product j, β′ is the parameter vector associated with the vector of product
attributes Xj, and εij is a random error term that captures unobservable contributions to
utility. Under the assumption that εij follows an extreme value type 1 (EV1) distribution,
the MNL choice probability that individual i chooses alternative j from the available set of
K alternatives, can be expressed as
Pij =
exp(αj + β
′Xj)∑K
k=1 exp(αk + β
′Xk)
. (1)
While the MNL model is useful to make preliminary inferences, the independence from
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property implies the estimated parameters are fixed amongst
the population, which further implies there are no differences in individuals’ preferences.
While a convenient form, the IIA assumption places limitations on the MNL model.
A more advanced choice model that relaxes the assumption of IIA and permits het-
erogeneity amongst consumers is the mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model. Assuming
that utility can be succinctly defined Uij = β
′
iXj + εij where βi = β̄ + ηzi, the (expected)
probability of individual i selecting alternative j can be defined
E[Pij|βi] =
∫
βi
exp β′iXj∑K
k=1 exp β
′
iXj
f(βi)dβi. (2)
Note that zi is a random draw from an underlying (multivariate) distribution, which we
discuss further below. The MMNL has a number of important advantages over the MNL.
In particular, it provides more realistic substitution patterns (e.g. marginal effects and
elasticities) and willingness-to-pay estimates.
A further popular model that relaxes the IIA assumption and permits heterogeneity is
the latent class (LC) model (Kamakura and Russell, 1989).5 LC models offers an extension
4Although the origins of discrete choice theory can be traced back almost 100 years, the contributions of
Daniel McFadden were pivotal in development of the area. See, in particular, McFadden (1986).
5The ability to identify market segments resulted in LC models being originally used in market research.
See, for example, Gupta and Chintagunta (1994) and Wedel and Kamakura (2000).
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to the standard MNL model by assuming a finite number of consumer classes account for
preference heterogeneity amongst alternative choice. The LC model estimates Equation 1
for S classes and predicts the probability Mis that individual i belongs in class s. The
unconditional probability of choosing alternative j becomes
Pij =
S∑
s=1
Pij|sMis (3)
given
Pij|s =
exp(αjs + β
′
sXj)∑K
k=1 exp(αks + β
′
sXk)
s = 1, ..., S and Mis =
exp(γ′sZi)∑S
s=1 exp(γ
′
sZi)
,
where γs is the parameter vector associated with the class characteristics defined by Zi. De-
termination of the appropriate number of latent classes requires the minimisation of a model
selection index such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC), along with ensuring that the parameters of the classes are behaviourally
valid.6 Our primary interest in the LC model is in being able to segment consumer types in
relation to answers given in the ‘post-experiment’ survey that we discuss below.
3.2 Experiments
Overview of design and choice tasks
A series of laboratory-based stated-preference experiments were conducted at a large Aus-
tralian university during August and October, 2017. Each participant was provided with a
set of instructions, as well as the appropriate ethics consent documentation.7 Instructions
were subsequently read to participants who were seated in partitioned booths. Each partic-
ipant was paid A$20 (Australian dollars) for their time, which typically was 30-45 minutes.
Approximately six months after these experiments, a follow-up survey was undertaken. Each
participant was compensated with a A$5 gift voucher. This is described in more detail below.
In total, 151 participants completed the experiments (and post-experiment survey). The
number of participants was selected to sufficiently exceed the largest S -estimate for each
individual model parameter. The S -estimate is derived from the estimated prior parameters
and standard errors. It represents the minimum sample size required to obtain a statistically
6The AIC and BIC criteria are respectively defined AIC = −2LL + 2P and BIC = −2LL + (ln(N))P ,
where LL is the value of the log-likelihood function at convergence, P is the number of parameters in the
model and N is the total sample size.
7Participant instructions and consent forms are provided in the Online Appendix.
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significant estimate of each individual parameter at 95% confidence (Rose and Bleimer, 2013).
In our experiments, the largest S-estimate was 87, which is significantly below our sample
size of 151.
Participants were a mix of undergraduate and postgraduate students of the university.
Although not representative of the entire population, the advantage of studying this demo-
graphic cohort are that they are well known to be among the most avid consumers of film
and TV content across different platforms. However, given that our sample skews towards
a younger tech-savvy cohort, and likely with lower disposable incomes, it is probable that
the results are biased towards newer forms of content delivery, such as SVoD and illegal
alternatives. Despite the limitations arising from the lack of heterogeneity in demographic
characteristics (e.g. age, income), our post-experiment survey nevertheless reveals significant
variation in attitudinal and behavioural traits that allow us to segment participants in the
the LC model, which we discuss in detail in Section 4.5.
The first stage of the laboratory exercise presented participants with 15 forthcoming
films across a range of genres. For each title, participants were provided an information
sheet listing the genre, director, writer, cast, and brief synopsis.8 Participants selected
whether they were either ‘highly likely’, ‘fairly likely’, or (default) not likely to view each of
the films. This design negated the need for a ‘no (alternative) selection’ option (as would be
generally required without this conditioning stage) and allows for more nuanced estimates
of utility, marginal effects, and willingness to pay. After selecting viewing intention for each
film, participants completed a series of 10 choice tasks based initially on the films selected as
‘highly likely’ to view, followed by 10 choice tasks on films selected as ‘fairly likely’ to view.
At the top of each ‘choice task’ screen, participants had a reminder list of the films they had
selected with respect to their viewing intention.9
At the completion of the 10 film choice tasks, participants progressed to the TV stage
of the experiment. As with the film stage, participants were initially presented with 15
upcoming TV series and asked to select which of these they were ‘highly likely’ or ‘fairly
likely’ to view (or by default, not view). Following this step, they completed nine choice
tasks for both viewing intention types. The difference between the film and TV sets is simply
because ‘cinema’ is not relevant for TV viewing decisions. Again, their list of selected TV
series was displayed to help frame the exercise.
8An example information sheet is provided in the Online Appendix (Figure A1).
9Example choice tasks are shown in the Online Appendix (Figure A2).
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Alternatives and availability design
Satisfaction of the global utility maximizing rule that governs discrete choice experiments
is dependent upon presenting all of the alternatives in the choice tasks to each respondent.
This rule applies even if some of the alternatives are only available to a subset of respondents,
or if some alternatives garner only a small share of the context being examined. With this
in mind, a crucial first step in experimental design involves defining the universal but finite
list of alternatives. In total, 10 viewing alternatives were considered for film and nine for
TV as listed in Table 1. However, it is well known that such a large set of alternatives may
cognitively overburden respondents. For example, Caussade et al. (2005) note that increases
in the number of alternatives has a large influence on the error variance of the estimated
utility function and suggest the optimal number of alternatives is around four.
There are various remedial measures to deal with problems arising from large (universal)
sets of alternatives but typically the solution involves a subjective refinement of the set to
include fewer options. Instead of proceeding this way, we make use of the recent innovative
‘availability design’ method developed by Rose, Louviere and Bliemer (2013). This design
assigns a subset of alternatives from the universal list to each respondent. Practically, this
means participants are presented with different subsets of alternatives in each completed
choice task. In the context of our problem, out of the total 10 film (or nine TV) alternatives,
each choice task contains a subset of only five of these. Over the course of the 10 (nine)
choice tasks, each film (TV) alternative was presented exactly the same number of times to
each participant, ensuring a balanced global design.
In order to determine the most efficient selection of choice tasks, a D-efficient experimen-
tal design was adopted.10 Efficient designs predict the standard errors by determining the
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix (AVC) of the underlying experiment, based on some
prior information about the parameter estimates.11 The efficiency of a design is determined
by the minimisation of some ‘efficiency error’. While a variety of efficiency measures have
been proposed, one of the most common is the D-error, which calculates the determinant
of the AVC matrix Ω1 (that is to say, ΩN is calculated for a single respondent). Hensher,
Rose and Greene (2015) note that in practice it is difficult to find a design with the ‘lowest’
10Efficiency in this context refers to reliable parameter estimates with small standard errors.
11Formally, the AVC matrix ΩN is defined as follows:
ΩN (X,Y, β̃) = −[ E(IN (X,Y, β))]−1 = −
[
∂2LN (X,Y, β̃)
∂β∂β′
]−1
(4)
where X represents the experimental design, Y the outcomes of the choice tasks, and β the associated
parameter values. IN (X,Y, β) is the Fisher information matrix with N respondents, while LN (X, β̃) is the
log-likelihood function for N respondents.
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D-error, known as a D-optimal design. Instead, researchers tend to settle for a ‘sufficiently
low’ D-error, known as a D-efficient design.
As noted in Equation 4, efficient designs require some prior estimates of β. The priors
used for the estimation of the D-efficient design were obtained using a pilot survey of 15 re-
spondents. The location and structure of the pilot survey was identical to the one described
above. Each respondent completed 10 choice tasks for each of the four branches of the exper-
iment (i.e. film and TV, both ‘highly likely’ and ‘fairly likely’), resulting in 150 observations
per branch. This permitted the estimation of initial MNL models. The β parameters from
each model were then used as priors for the D-efficient designs.
Attributes and attribute levels
Having defined the alternatives, the next step is to determine the attributes and associated
levels of each attribute. This is not a simple task as each alternative in a labelled choice
experiment may incorporate a mix of common and uncommon attributes. Furthermore, even
if two alternatives have similar attributes, the levels associated with each of those attributes
may differ from alternative to alternative.
When alternatives have shared attributes it is vital to ensure that the levels decision
makers cognitively associate with each alternative are not different. Attribute ambiguity
such as this will add to the unobserved variance in choice between alternatives. It is also
important to avoid certain inter-attribute correlations that may result in cognitively unac-
ceptable combinations within the design and bias results. For example, a decision maker
may assume a strong correlation between the price and quality attributes. Presenting a
choice task which does not represent this relationship (such as high price, low quality) may
therefore cause the decision maker to stop taking the experiment seriously.
With these criteria in mind we define attributes related to price, viewing quality, release
delay and (for the illegal options only) punishment probability and punishment fine. While
other attributes could certainly be included, we focus on these as being the most relevant
for consumers. This necessarily means that other (alternative-specific) attributes become
part of the implicit choice process, which has important implications for the analysis as
we discuss below. Furthermore, with some caveats, the selected attributes are firm-level
strategic variables, which provide managerial implications for the analysis.
The next step is to define levels for each of the attributes listed above. There is no set
number of recommend levels for each attribute (and the number of levels does not need to
be the same for each attribute). It is worth noting, however, that each possible attribute
level is mapped to a point in the utility space, therefore the more levels included, the more
accurately we can map the utility function. Attribute levels must be carefully specified so
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they make sense to the participants. Ideally the extreme values of quantitative attribute
levels should lie just outside the ranges of what the participant might consider reasonable
in order to provide gain a better understanding of the trade-offs between choices and obtain
more accurate estimation results. Furthermore, evenly spaced attribute levels (e.g. 1, 3, 5,
7 not 1, 4, 5, 7) are preferred when estimating the effects of quantitative attributes. With
these considerations in mind, attributes and levels were selected as shown in Table 2.
One particular alternative/attribute relationship warrants further discussion. Specifi-
cally, the price of (bundled) SVoD (e.g. Netflix) and traditional pay-TV subscription ser-
vices. Participants were explicitly told that the prices of these alternatives did not represent
the cost of the subscription but an ‘effective price per film (or TV series)’ within that bundle.
The instructions read: “For some viewing options this represents a proportion of the total
fee paid for a service. It is important to note that the price listed does not represent the
cost of a viewing option as a whole. Instead the price reflects the effective ‘cost per film’ or
‘cost per TV series’ of that particular service.”12 While in reality consumers do not make
purchase decisions like this, we frame it this way to enable comparison between alternatives
conditional on a film or TV series choice. Clearly, this formulation requires deeper thinking
concerning the (subjective) value and cost of bundled content more generally.
In our study, it is implicitly assumed that selecting a bundled alternative will incur ad-
ditional cost above the ‘effective price’ to meet the full price of a subscription. By design,
when a participant makes any stated-preference choice they are required to make an assess-
ment of the (net) benefits of each alternative based on their own preferences over product
characteristics, which may or may not be completely reflected in the defined attributes. For
example, in the context of the cinema alternative in our study, a participant may consider
the appeal of a large screen, dynamic sound system, and candy bar as part of the implicit
cinema experience—even though none of these things are explicitly included as attributes.
Equally, costs (beyond the ticket price) might also feature in the decision-making process.
For example, the cost of transport, parking, or candy bar items.
In a somewhat similar way, a subscription alternative implies benefits and costs beyond
the specific film or TV series under consideration. Most relevant is the value of the addi-
tional (bundled) content relative to the total bundle price. This is in addition to whatever
other (implicitly-valued) net benefits this alternative may provide (e.g. potential to watch
on mobile devices).13 Of course, some participants might misunderstand the instructions
12See participant instructions in the Online Appendix.
13We can apply simple bundling theory to demonstrate the decision process. In particular, a consumer
will purchase a bundle containing product j if vj + v−j + εB ≤ pB , where vj denotes value of j, v−j denotes
value of other products in the bundle not equal j, εB denotes unobserved (net) benefits of bundle B, and
pB is the bundle price. Therefore, if the consumer selects the alternative with ‘effective price’ pj , then
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relating to ‘effective price’ and think of it as the price for the entire bundle. In this case,
the willingness-to-pay estimates for the bundle are the same as those for the specific title.
Alternatively, other participants might view SVoD content as part of a bundle purchase, and
therefore not be willing to pay a positive price for any individual title if included as part of
the bundle. We discuss these possibilities further in Section 4.4.
Post-experiment and follow-up surveys
Following the completion of the stated-preference choice tasks, each participant completed a
‘post experiment survey’ designed to capture information relating to attitudes and experience
with piracy, as well as more general demographic information. The primary purpose of the
post-experiment survey was to gather data for estimation of the membership functions of the
LC model discussed in Section 3.1. There were five sets of questions that were used to capture
information on the following: i) participant’s history of illegal film and TV consumption;
ii) perceived ‘risk’ of getting caught illegally accessing content; iii) perceived ‘damage’ that
illegal consumption has on the content industry; and iv) general demographic questions.14
In order to help validate the experimental stated-preference approach, participants also
completed a short online ‘follow-up survey’ approximately six-months after the laboratory-
based experiments (and post-experiment survey) took place. The timing of this survey was
chosen such that almost all of the titles had been released in the cinema (if applicable) as well
as on video-on-demand (VoD) services and physical formats. Participants were contacted
via email and directed to a website where they were shown the 15 films and 15 TV series
from the original experiments. For each film/TV series, they were asked if (and how) they
viewed each title. In order to prevent potential bias, participants were not reminded of
the choices they made during the initial experiment while completing the follow-up survey.
These responses were then cross checked with the viewing intention stated in the first stage
of the experiments.
4 Results
4.1 Overview of design and selections
Table 3 provides details regarding the design and selections by participants. As described in
Section 3.2, each participant completed 10 film choice tasks related to i) ‘highly likely’ and ii)
v−j + εB ≥ pB − pj . That is, the value of other products apart from j combined with unobserved (net)
bundle benefits exceed the difference between the bundle and effective price.
14The post-experiment survey questions are provided in the Online Appendix.
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‘fairly likely’ selections, then completed 9 TV choice tasks related to i) ‘highly likely’ and ii)
‘fairly likely’ selections. These resulted in 1510 film observations, and 1359 TV observations.
With regard to films classified as ‘highly likely’, respondents selected cinema almost 30%
of the time, and VoD options (both purchase and subscription) also featured prominently
with a combined 25% of selections. This broadly confirms that cinema is still a strongly
preferred alternative for highly-anticipated releases, but also that the new SVoD services
provide a popular alternative to traditional viewing formats.
The evidence for films rated as ‘fairly likely’ reveals a much lower number of cinema
selections (9.5%) and that free-to-air TV (32%) remains relevant for participants where
advertising interruptions represent an implicit form of payment. Both purchased and sub-
scription VoD were also much lower (combined 13%) relative to the highly-likely films, but
DVD purchases and rentals both increased (12% to 18% combined). Interestingly, both ille-
gal downloading and illegal streaming revealed themselves more attractive for a-priori less
attractive films (21% to 14% combined). This suggests that respondents prefer implicit pay-
ment in terms of potential punishment and/or lower quality over monetary outlays, which
is not inconsistent with implicit payment through advertising.
The observed choices relating to TV viewing alternatives reveals broadly similar evidence
as films. In particular, the two VoD alternatives are popular with the ‘highly likely’ TV series
and less popular with their ‘fairly likely’ counterparts (27% to 19% combined). Free-to-air is
much more popular with the latter type of series (40% compared to 25%), again suggestive
that participants are more willing to accept advertising as part of the viewing experience for
less-attractive TV offerings. Overall, illegal consumption options were selected marginally
more for TV shows of less appeal (19% compared to 17%) but the overall difference was not
as apparent as it were for the different types of films.
4.2 MNL and MMNL results
The MNL and MMNL results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. In a number of respects,
the results are similar and reveal the alternative-specific constants are markedly different
for both films and TV series with respect to classification as ‘highly likely’ or ‘fairly likely’.
For ‘highly likely’ films, both models support cinema as providing most utility. The SVoD
alternative ranks strongly in terms of relative alternative-specific constant. For both models,
the ‘fairly likely’ films suggest a lower relative utility from cinema (but still providing most
utility), followed by SVoD. The free-to-air alternative is also relatively higher in the ‘fairly
likely’ models. Illegal downloading also features as important in the ‘highly likely’ MMNL
model, which is not observed in the MNL models. We believe this difference extends from
14
modelling the punishment attribute variables as random, which reflects the heterogeneity in
participants attitudes towards punishment of illegal activity.
All attributes in the film MNL and MMNL models have signage that accords with a-priori
intuition. Specifically, quality improvements increase utility, whereas increased release delays
and higher prices decrease utility. Both punishment probabilities and (potential) fine are
negative in signage, as would be expected (but are insignificant in the MNL model). The
implications of the estimated coefficients are discussed in the following sections with respect
to substitution patterns (i.e. marginal effects) and willingness-to-pay estimates.
The results of the MNL and MMNL models relating to TV viewing confirm the popularity
of SVoD, which provides the most utility for MNL and second highest utility for MMNL in
terms of ‘highly likely’ series. As was observed with ‘highly likely’ films, illegal downloading
is also highly relevant for ‘highly likely’ TV series in the MMNL model. As observed with film
models, all attribute coefficients in the TV MNLs conform with a-priori intuition in terms of
signage and all display statistical significance (with exception of the punishment attributes in
the MNL and ‘quality’ in the MMNL model). Again, implications of the estimated attribute
coefficients are discussed further in the following sections.
As already noted, the MMNL is able to provide more realistic substitution patterns as
it does not suffer from the IIA property. We are most interested in examining relationships
between alternative selections and attributes including price, viewing quality, release delay,
and (potential) punishment for illegal viewing. Therefore, we model each of these as random
parameters as reported in Table 5. In particular, all random parameters are assumed to be
normally distributed, but we model price as a triangular distribution to ensure acceptable
willingness-to-pay estimates (see Hensher, Rose and Greenee; 2015, p. 622).
4.3 Marginal effects
Due to the IIA property, the MNL produces unrealistic substitution patterns. Therefore,
we report marginal effects of ‘own’ and ‘cross’ attributes from the MMNL model. These are
respectively computed as
δPjnxjkn =
dPj
dxjk
=
∫
βi
dUj
dxjk
Pj (1− Pj) f(βi)dβi∫
βi
Pjf(βi)dβi
and δPjnxj′kn =
dPj
dxj′k
=
∫
βi
dUj
dxj′k
PjPj′f(βi)dβi∫
βi
Pjf(βi)dβi
,
(5)
where Pj and Pj′ are choice probabilities of alternatives j and j
′ 6= j and xjk is the kth
attribute of j. However, because the MMNL is non-linear, aggregation of the individual-
specific elasticities may return biased elasticities. We follow Louviere, Hensher and Swait
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(2000) and use probability-weighted sample enumerated marginal effects defined as
δP̄jxj′k =
(
N∑
n=1
P̂jnδ
Pjn
xj′kn
)
/
N∑
n=1
P̂jn, (6)
where P̂jn is the estimated probability and P̄j is the aggregate probability of j.
Own-attribute marginal effects
Table 6 reports own-attribute marginal effects for each alternative with respect to various
attributes for both films and TV series, as well as by viewing intention. With respect to
price, it is clear that marginal effects for ‘highly likely’ films and TV series are lower than
their ‘fairly likely’ counterparts, which reflects the ex-ante popularity of such titles.
Both film and TV viewership is more likely with increased viewing quality and shorter
release delays across all alternatives, which is observed across both ‘highly likely’ and ‘fairly
likely’ types. However, there is no clear (own marginal effect) dominance with respect to
viewing intention, as was evident with respect to price. This suggests participants respond
differently to the various alternatives and that attributes are of different relevance for differ-
ent alternatives. Finally, the marginal effects related to illegal downloading suggest both the
probability of receiving a fine and amount of the fine if caught deter illegal consumption.15
Cross-attribute marginal effects
In this section, give our interest in understanding the disruption created by SVoD, we focus
only a small subset of the most relevant cross-attribute marginal effects that we estimate.16
In particular, we focus on cross marginal effects related to the SVoD and (illegal) downloading
alternatives presented visually in Figures 1 and 2.
With respect to changes in the price of SVoD for film, it is clear that purchased VoD is
the most likely substitute. However, for TV more traditional Pay-TV and DVD purchases
options remain important. Free-to-air TV and (illegal) downloading also feature among the
more likely substitutes alternatives. With respect to viewing quality and release delays of
both SVoD film and TV, there is little evidence of substitution, i.e. most cross marginal
effects are close to zero. Taken literally, these imply that SVoD consumers are not as sensitive
to these attributes, which in some respects reflects the fact that such services continue to
offer standard definition (SD) packages and specialise on a catalogue of older-release titles.
15Note that only the (illegal) download alternative is reported as the (illegal) streaming alternative is
normalised in estimation.
16The full set of marginal effects are reported in the Online Appendix (Tables A1-A8).
16
The illegal download estimated cross marginal effects reveal that both increasing prob-
ability of a fine or the fine amount itself result in only limited substitution towards legal
alternatives. This is particularly true for ‘highly likely’ types. For illegal downloads of TV
series, there is some evidence that pay-TV purchases increase if either the probability of
punishment or fine increases. However, in both cases, the size of the effect is limited.
4.4 Willingness to pay
Australian context
To provide context for the Australian dollar denominated willingness-to-pay (WTP) esti-
mates discussed below, the 2017 average price for a cinema admission was A$14.30. How-
ever, it should be noted that this estimate is based on a measure of revenue divided by
all admissions and includes concession and discounted tickets.17 At most major city multi-
plexes, the full adult price is typically A$20-A$25. At the end of 2017, a Netflix subscription
cost A$13.99 for a standard plan and A$17.99 for a premium plan. An iTunes purchase
typically costs A$15-A$25 for a new-release film title. With respect to DVD purchase and
rental, a variety of prices exist but typically cost A$20-A$30 for a new-release purchase, or
A$6-A$8 for an overnight rental of the same title. A (pay-per-view) pay-TV movie purchase
would cost A$5.95 (SD) or A$6.95 (HD) on the main pay-TV provider. Finally, base pay-TV
subscriptions of the same provider cost A$26 with HD costing an extra A$10.
WTP estimates
Table 7 reports WTP estimates for both film and TV by viewing intention. The MNL values
are directly calculated as the ratio of the estimated coefficient for alternative j (or attribute
k) and the estimated price coefficient, as reported in Table 4. In order to obtain the MMNL
values, we follow Hensher and Greene (2003) and derive WTP figures based on unconditional
parameter estimates.18 The standard deviation of each of the mean WTP values is also
reported. Clearly ‘highly likely’ titles are consistently valued more highly than ‘fairly likely’
titles, which reflects the greater value consumers place on them. As described above, these
estimates conform broadly with actual prices paid for content in the Australian market. As
one example, assuming a A$20 cinema admission, a consumer would receive positive surplus
for a ‘highly likely’ film but negative surplus for one considered ‘fairly likely’.
17See https://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/fact-finders/cinema/industry-trends/box-office/
ticket-prices.
18WTP figures based on conditional parameter estimates were also calculated and were comparable to the
unconditional figures presented in Table 7.
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With respect to SVoD, WTP for ‘highly likely’ films and TV series suggests considerable
consumer surplus given the relative price of a typical subscription (e.g. Netflix). Recalling
that participants selecting this alternative did so on the basis of ‘effective price’ per film
(or TV series) implies WTP for the actual bundle is (possibly much) larger. Even if some
participants misunderstood the instruction relating to ‘effective price’ and viewed it as in-
clusive of the bundle, the WTP estimates would then represent lower bound for the bundle.
Another potential misunderstanding about SVoD price could occur if participants assumed
an existing subscription, and attached zero marginal cost to (additional) bundled items. If
such a misunderstanding occurred in our experiments, we would expect a significant propor-
tion of participants not to select SVoD in any choice task given all SVoD were associated
with positive prices (as provided in Table 2). However, of the 151 participants, we observe
132 (i.e. 87.4%) selecting SVoD at least once, which we believe alleviates concern about this
particular type of misunderstanding. Therefore, based on our WTP estimates and compari-
son with the pay-TV (subscription) alternative, Netflix’s current pricing appears low relative
to the value derived by consumers even by providing only films and/or TV series that are
‘fairly likely’ to be consumed.
Beyond WTP estimates for the various alternatives, we are also able to measure WTP
for incremental changes in the attribute levels implicit in the design. The WTP estimates
related to quality and release delay reveal consumers are willing to pay more (less) for
increased quality (release delay) for ‘highly likely’ relative to ‘fairly likely’ titles. This is true
for both film and TV and reflects the importance of these attributes for more popular titles.
In particular, in relation to the quality estimates the values are within a range that conform
with industry practice as outlined above. For example, the relative price differences between
standard definition (SD) and high definition (HD) films purchased via pay-TV equates to
A$1. In terms of the difference in Netflix subscription costs of standard and premium (4K)
this equates to A$4 (per month). Finally, we also observe a decrease in WTP for increased
chance of being caught and the amount of fine if caught. However, relative to estimated
WTP value placed on these illegal alternatives, the size of these decreases appears small.
This raises some questions about the perceived efficacy of the punishments.
4.5 Latent class model
As outlined in Section 3.2, we conducted a post-experiment survey to collect data related to
actual (illegal) piracy experience, attitudes towards piracy, and demographic information.
The primary intention of this exercise was to generate accompanying data to be used in the
LC model. Based on these questions, we investigated potential classes related to the fol-
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lowing: i) number of films illegally downloaded or streamed, denoted ‘FILMDL’; i) number
of TV series illegally downloaded or streamed, denoted ‘TVDL’; ii) risk perception of ille-
gal consumption, denoted ‘RISK’; iii) (industry) damage perception of illegal consumption,
denoted ‘DAMAGE’; iv) number of films/TV shows selected as ‘highly likely’ (out of 15),
denoted ‘FILMTOT’/‘TVTOT’; and v) various demographic information, which were not
ultimately included in the LC model due to lack of variation within our cohort (discussed
further below).19 Although we lack variation in the demographic variables, we note substan-
tial variation in responses to the other survey questions permitting us to robustly estimate
the LC model. For this exercise, we limited attention to ‘highly likely’ films and TV series.
As discussed in Section 3.1, the appropriate number of classes in the LC model is deter-
mined by the minimisation of a selection criterion such as the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) or the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). In our case, increasing the number of
latent classes from one to two leads to a decrease in both AIC and BIC. However, in both the
film and TV models, as the number of classes was increased from two to three, the parame-
ter estimates became unstable with large standard errors and very small class probabilities
indicating an over-fitting of the model (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Subsequent analysis is
therefore based on the presence of two latent classes of film viewers and two latent classes of
TV viewers. In both the film and TV models, the estimated class sizes were approximately
equal. The results are presented in Table 8.
Based on the parameter estimates of the LC models the following ex-post classification
of film and TV viewers is proposed:
i. Film Class 1: Members of this class demonstrate a clear preference for watching highly-
anticipated films at the cinema or via illegal downloads, as well as deriving a relatively
high level of utility from a variety of other formats. They pay little regard to quality,
but are sensitive to release dates. We define viewers in this class as film buffs.
ii. Film Class 2: Viewers in this class place an emphasis on the quality of the viewing
experience. They are more price sensitive than the viewers in Class 1 and therefore
show a desire to watch films on legal on-demand services, in particular SVoD, rather
than in the cinema. We define viewers in this class as the Netflix generation.
iii. TV Class 1: Due to their willingness to view TV shows on a wide variety of both
traditional and digital legal formats. Such viewers demonstrate a strong desire to watch
TV shows as close as possible to their release date, prioritising this over the quality of
the viewing experience. Members of this class are considered to be TV junkies.
19FILMDL, TVDL, RISK, and DAMAGE, were computed from (average) responses from the post-
experiment survey Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4, respectively. See Online Appendix.
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iv. TV Class 2: Members in this class derive much less utility from their TV viewing
experiences than Class 1. These viewers gain a similar level of satisfaction from viewing
TV shows via F2A or SVoD services, but eschew other viewing platforms. These type
are therefore be considered to be casual viewers
In relation to the two film classes, the positive coefficient on ‘risk perception’ suggests
that the first class perceives illegal viewing to be more risky than the members of the second
class (albeit not by much). Reconciling this with the fact that members of the first class
receive a high utility of (illegal) downloading suggests they are aware of the risks but choose
to partake in the activity nonetheless. The other variable of significance in the film context
relates to the ‘number of films selected’. The negative coefficient suggests that the first class
are more selective in their choices, particularly as they derive strong utility from cinema.
With respect to the TV LC model results, we were again able to identify ‘risk perception’
as a variable that separated the two classes. In this exercise, the second class perceived illegal
viewing to be more risky, however neither class show a tendency to illegally view TV shows.
The first class also selected more TV shows (of the 15) on offer than Class 2. This conforms
with the observed higher utility they derive for all methods of viewing.
Finally, while we do believe there to be significant demographic effects that determine
viewing preferences, our data do not exhibit enough heterogeneity to identify any of these
effects in the LC models. This is almost certainly due to the fact that our participants were
primarily students restricting the observed ranges of age, income, education, etc.
4.6 Follow-up survey results
The primary intention of the follow-up survey is to establish some credibility in the prim-
ing mechanism, which preceded the stated-preference choice experiments. Recalling that
each participant was presented with 15 forthcoming films and 15 forthcoming TV series,
we observe individual-specific viewing intention for each title as i) ‘highly likely’, ii) ‘fairly
likely’, or neither. The follow-up survey took the same set of films and TV series and asked
whether each title had been viewed and, if so, how it was viewed. The survey took place
approximately six months after the experiment.
At the outset, it should be noted that due to the windowing and licensing effects, not
all films and TV series had been released on all platforms at the time of the follow-up
survey. For example, a number of cinema-release films had not been released on free-to-air
TV and many TV series had only been licensed to one broadcaster after six (or less) months.
Therefore, the intention of this exercise is not to compare alternative selections between the
stated-preference experiments with the follow-up survey results. Rather, the intention is to
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examine how films and TV series reported ex-post viewed in follow-up survey (independent
of viewing mode) correspond to the ex-ante stated viewing intention.
In this respect, the follow-up survey offers encouragement that the priming mechanism
was highly effective. After quality-control questions, we had a response rate of 58% from the
original 151 participants contacted six months after the experiments. Survey respondents
were presented with the same set of 15 films and 15 TV series provided during the experiment
and asked which titles had actually been watched at the time of the follow-up survey. Pooled
across all respondents, 96.4% of films and 97.1% of the TV series identified matched with
those selected as either ‘highly likely’ or ‘fairly likely’ to watch during the experiment six
months beforehand. That is, of the TV series and films actually viewed from the full set,
almost all of them had been nominated as either ‘highly likely’ or ‘fairly likely’, suggesting
a strong link between stated intention and actual behaviour. The follow-up survey also
permitted examination relating to the popularity of specific titles against those identified
by the priming mechanism. To investigate this, we ranked each film and TV series by the
number of participants who selected ’highly likely’ and compared this against the ranking of
specific titles from the follow-up survey. The Spearman rank-order correlation was found to
be 0.94 for film and 0.65 for TV series.
In terms of (actual) alternatives reported in the follow-up survey, cinema was identified
for 74.4% of films and SVoD for 59.4% of TV series viewed. However, as suggested above,
this is not surprising given all of the films in our study had an initial (planned) theatrical
release (i.e. windowing effect), and that nine of the 15 TV series were Netflix or other
SVoD releases. Following cinema and SVoD, the next most popular alternatives in terms
of observed choices were the illegal alternatives of streaming and downloading, respectively.
The combined total of the illegal alternatives was 19.5% for film and 23.8% for TV series.
With the passing of time, the distribution over alternatives would almost certainly alter.
5 Summary and concluding remarks
This study has applied stated-preference choice experiments in a setting where consumers
consider film and TV alternatives against a set of broadly-defined product attributes. Based
on our results, we are able to draw a number of inferences concerning the impact of SVoD
on more established modes of film and TV consumption. In particular, while cinema and
free-to-air programming still offer much appeal, it is clear that SVoD is creating significant
disruption and is highly valued by consumers. This was particularly evident in the WTP
estimates, which are substantially above current SVoD pricing. With the apparent surplus
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consumers are deriving from these services, it is not surprising that the adoption of Netflix
(and other SVoD services) has been so pervasive across the world.
Our results also reveal a number of other interesting findings. First, all of the alterna-
tive/attribute marginal utilities, substitution effects, and willingness to pay estimates di-
rectly relate to the ex-ante appeal of a film or TV series. As would be expected, we observe
a smaller (absolute) price marginal effects for film and TV of greater appeal. We observe
that consumers suffer reduced utility from release delays (relative to the initial international
release), and lower-quality viewing experiences also reduces utility. However, the relationship
between quality and release delays vis-à-vis viewing intention varies across alternatives.
Second, we observe that consumers are heterogeneous in their consumption preferences
and behaviour, even within homogeneous viewing intention groups. This is evident in the LC
model results, where we identified two broad film consumer types (‘film buffs’ and ‘Netflix
generation’), and two broad TV consumer types (‘TV junkies’ and ‘casual viewers’).
Third, we find mixed evidence regarding the effectiveness of anti-piracy policy. In par-
ticular, while increasing punishment probabilities and fines decrease utilities, the implied
(own and cross attribute) marginal effects are small. Furthermore, the willingness-to-pay
estimates suggests only a relatively small decline in value associated with anti-piracy poli-
cies. While we cannot be certain about the precise origin of these findings, they may relate
specifically to the participants we study.
More generally, we contribute to the applied stated-preference literature in two ways.
First, the separation of experiments with respect to ex-ante interest allows comparison of
utility, marginal effects, and willingness-to-pay. We are unaware of other research employing
this approach. Second, it applies the novel ‘availability design’. This method holds much
appeal in settings (such as ours) where consumers face a relatively large set of alternatives.
We are also encouraged by the results of the follow-up survey. In particular, we observe a
high correlation between actual titles viewed and stated viewing intention, as well as between
titles ranked in terms of ex-ante and ex-post popularity. With accepted caveats, we believe
this provides validation of both the priming mechanism and stated-preference approach more
generally. Of course, the primary motivation for using such an approach relates to the general
unavailability of revealed-preference data, so this validation is encouraging.
With the flexibility of stated-preference design, there is much scope for future work using
these methods. For example, investigation of the specific attributes of SVoD that are most
valued by consumers. This could include attributes related to content (e.g. back catalogue
vs. new content), or technological dimensions of service (e.g. number of permitted devices).
Another general question is whether similar results hold for other samples, in particular using
a less-homogeneous sample in terms of age, income, etc. Alternatively, do the implications
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of this analysis hold for similar demographic cohorts in other markets, particularly those
with different institutional environments.
Finally, there is further scope to evaluate the effectiveness of policies designed to curtail
digital piracy. While this paper has implicitly examined policy related closely to the ‘gradu-
ated response’ approach, this type of approach has increasingly lost favour in key countries
and alternative policies have been introduced to achieve the same objectives. For example,
the blocking of websites supporting piracy has been applied in various territories. Given
that illegal behaviour might be altered by the different policies, it is of interest to examine
how this might impact consumption.
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Table 1: Alternatives
Abbreviation Alternative Definition Repeat
Viewing
CIN Cinema Standard seat in local cinema No
F2A Free-to-Air Television Ad-supported network television No
VODP VoD—Purchase One-off purchase (e.g. Apple iTunes) Yes
VODS (SVoD) VoD—Subscription Monthly subscription (e.g. Netflix) Yes
DVDP DVD—Purchase Outright purchase Yes
DVDR DVD—Rental Physical rental from local vendor No
PAYS Pay TV—Subscription Monthly subscription (e.g. Foxtel) No
PAYP Pay TV—Pay Per View Online rental (e.g. Apple iTunes rental) No
ILDL Illegal—Download BitTorrent download (e.g. Pirate Bay) Yes
ILST Illegal—Stream Online streaming (e.g. Megaupload) Yes
27
Table 2: Attributes
Abbreviation Attribute Attribute levels
PRICE Price per film (AUD) 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30
Price per TV series (AUD) 10, 20, 30, 40, 50
QUAL Picture quality HD, SD, Poor (illegal options)
RELEASE Months since world premiere release 0, 3, 6, 9, 12
FINEPC Probability of fine (%) (illegal options) 0, 25, 50, 75
FINEDL Fine (AUD) (illegal options) 50, 100, 150, 200
28
Table 3: Summary of Design and Selections
Film TV
Alternative No. Times Highly Fairly Highly Fairly
Presented Likely Likely Likely Likely
CIN 755 443 144
F2A 755 168 482 334 548
VODP 755 175 84 191 165
VODS 755 208 110 174 98
DVDP 755 128 148 169 69
DVDR 755 54 118 33 14
PAYS 755 76 63 104 68
PAYP 755 51 43 117 141
ILDL 755 117 201 130 164
ILST 755 90 117 107 92
Total 7550 1510 1510 1359 1359
Notes: Each of the 151 participants was presented with 10 film
choice tasks (total nFilm = 151× 10 = 1510) and 9 TV choice tasks
(total nTV = 151 × 9 = 1359). In each choice task, a participant
was presented with 5 alternatives, i.e. total number of alternative
NFilm = 151× 10× 5 = 7550 and NTV = 151× 9× 5 = 6795. The
availability design ensured each alternative was presented 755 times
during both the film and TV experiments.
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Table 6: Own Marginal Effects
Film TV
Highly Fairly Highly Fairly
Likely Likley Likely Likley
Price
CIN -0.347 -0.459
VODP -0.230 -0.374 -0.189 -0.354
VODS -0.255 -0.368 -0.300 -0.263
DVDP -0.192 -0.413 -0.267 -0.242
DVDR -0.092 -0.296 -0.070 -0.044
PAYS -0.091 -0.170 -0.203 -0.288
PAYP -0.068 -0.154 -0.177 -0.313
Quality
CIN 0.188 0.193
F2A 0.169 0.144 0.036 0.016
VODP 0.242 0.199 0.014 0.022
VODS 0.185 0.163 0.059 0.068
DVDP 0.098 0.098 0.055 0.071
DVDR 0.094 0.202 0.004 0.006
PAYS 0.071 0.018 0.028 0.033
PAYP 0.057 0.046 0.021 0.027
ILDL 0.125 0.085 0.020 0.013
Release Delay
CIN -0.065 -0.021
F2A -0.202 -0.186 -0.129 -0.105
VODP -0.087 -0.014 -0.029 -0.022
VODS -0.095 -0.047 -0.108 -0.063
DVDP -0.053 -0.053 -0.017 -0.004
DVDR -0.063 -0.150 -0.007 -0.009
PAYS -0.005 -0.012 -0.006 -0.002
PAYP -0.049 -0.086 -0.030 -0.040
ILDL -0.056 -0.044 -0.047 -0.052
Fine Probability
ILDL -0.155 -0.127 -0.202 -0.165
Fine Dollars
ILDL -0.138 -0.108 -0.100 -0.097
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Figure 1: SVoD Cross Marginal Effects – Price, Viewing Quality, Release Delay
Notes: All figures refer to cross marginal effects of SVoD attributes (price, viewing quality, release delay)
with respect to probability of listed alternative for either film or TV selection. Right hand side (horizontal)
drop lines (round markers) represent ’Highly Likely’ selections, and left hand side (horizontal) drop lines
(diamond markers) represent ’Fairly Likely’ selections. Price and release delay attributes marginal effects
take positive values. Quality marginal effects take negative values.
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Figure 2: Illegal Download Cross Marginal Effects – Fine Probability, Fine Dollars
Notes: All figures refer to cross marginal effects of illegal downloading punishment attributes (fine probability,
fine dollars) with respect to probability of listed alternative for either film or TV selection. Right hand side
(horizontal) drop lines (round markers) represent ’Highly Likely’ selections, and left hand side (horizontal)
drop lines (diamond markers) represent ’Fairly Likely’ selections. Price and release delay attributes marginal
effects take positive values. Quality marginal effects take negative values.
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Online Appendix
Post-experiment survey (comments in italics)
The first set of questions related to piracy habits, where answers were grouped as 1) 0, 2)
1-10, 3) 11-100, 4) 101-200, and 5) 201+:
1. How many films have you downloaded or steamed from unauthorized file sharing
sites?
2. How many TV series have you downloaded or steamed from unauthorized file sharing
sites?
The following sets of questions addressed ‘risk’ and ‘damage’ perceptions, and took the form
of answers on a five-point Likert scale (Agree Strongly to Disagree Strongly) and addressed
the following:
3. The probability of being caught using an unauthorized file sharing site is smaller
than:
i. Getting caught shoplifting
ii. Getting caught riding on public transportation without a valid ticket
iii. Getting a parking ticket for parking illegally
iv. Getting fined for speeding
4. For each of the following statements please state how strongly you agree or disagree.
i. By using file sharing sites to watch films and TV series I may cause damage to
actors and actresses
ii. By using file sharing sites to watch films and TV series I may cause damage to
writers, directors and producers
iii. I can get caught and punished for using file sharing sites
The final set of questions related to demographic information. These were stated as follows:
5. Please tell us your gender.
6. What is your age?
7. What is your highest level of education?
8. What is your annual after-tax household income?
9. In which country were you born?
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Participant Instructions and Consent Form
    
 
 _____ Survey on Film and Television Consumption 
   
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. 
 
The aim of this research project is to better understand the characteristics of 
consumption behaviour for television and films in Australia. This research is being 
conducted by _____.     
  
Instructions 
  
Please read this section carefully. If you have any questions about what is 
required from you please ask a member of the research team for assistance 
before beginning.  
  
This survey consists of five sections: 
  
1. You will first be shown a selection of upcoming film releases. For each of 
these releases you need to select how likely you are to watch the film in 
question.  
2. We will then present to you a number of alternative film viewing experiences. 
Each of these film viewing experiences has a variety of format 
choices (cinema, free to air television, streaming video on demand, 
etc.), along with certain attributes (picture quality, time since first release, 
price, etc.) for each format choice. Given the attributes associated with each 
format you are asked to select the alternative you would purchase. 
3. You will then be shown a selection of upcoming television series releases. 
For each of these releases you need to select how likely you are to watch the 
television series in question.  
4. We will then present to you a number of alternative television series viewing 
experiences. Once again, each of these television series viewing 
experiences has a variety of format choices (free to air television, streaming 
video on demand, DVD, etc.), along with certain attributes (picture quality, 
time since first release, price, etc.) for each format choice. Given the 
attributes associated with each format you are asked to select the alternative 
you would purchase. 
5. Finally we will ask you for some brief information about yourself.  
 
It is estimated that the survey will take approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
  
You will be paid $20 upon completion of this survey. A further $5 will be paid 
(in the form of a digital gift card) upon completion of a short (10 minute) online 
follow up survey which will be sent to your nominated email address around 
January 2018.  
Please note 
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Participant Instructions and Consent Form (cont.)
  
The ethical aspects of this study have been approved by the _____ Human 
Research Ethics Committee.  If you have any complaints or reservations about any 
ethical aspect of your participation in this research, you may contact the Committee 
through _____. Any complaint you make will be treated in confidence and 
investigated, and you will be informed of the outcome. 
  
This survey is confidential and the analysis will be performed using de-identified 
data. At no point will the identity of participants form any part of the research output 
of this project. Participation in this survey is voluntary. 
 
Further Information 
 
Further information and updates on the survey, along with final results of this 
research project can be obtained from _____. The anticipated completion date for 
the project is March 2018.  
 
Consent 
 
Completion of this questionnaire denotes consent to participate.  
 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep 
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Participant Instructions and Consent Form (cont.)
Viewing Option Definitions  
 
During the course of the survey you will be presented with a number of alternative 
ways to view film and TV series. Details of these alternatives are listed below, along 
with information on whether or not your choice of alternative permits repeat viewing 
(i.e. if you can watch the same film or TV series more than once with a single 
purchase). Please ask a member of the research team if any items require further 
clarification.  
 
Cinema  
Definition - Standard seat to watch a film in a local cinema 
Repeat viewings? – No, 1 viewing only, no recording permitted 
 
Free-to-Air Television 
Definition – Watching a film or TV series on a freely available Australian TV 
channel such as ABC, SBS, Channel 7, Channel 10, etc. 
Repeat viewings? – No, 1 viewing only, no recording permitted 
 
Streaming Video on Demand – Subscription  
Definition – Monthly subscription to an online entertainment library such as Netflix, 
STAN, Presto, etc. 
Repeat viewings? – Yes, unlimited viewings possible with working internet 
connection  
 
Streaming Video on Demand – Purchase 
Definition – One-off purchase from online store such as Apple iTunes, Google 
Play, etc. 
Repeat viewings? – Yes, unlimited viewings possible, file downloaded to user 
device for offline use 
  
DVD – Purchase  
Definition – Outright purchase of physical disc 
Repeat viewings? – Yes, unlimited viewings possible 
 
DVD – Rental  
Definition – 24-hour rental of physical disc from a local video store  
Repeat viewings? – No, 1 viewing only, no copying of disc permitted   
 
File Sharing Site - Download  
Definition – Use of BitTorrent download sources such as The Pirate Bay, Torrentz, 
etc. 
Repeat viewings? – Yes, unlimited viewings possible, file downloaded to user 
device for offline use  
 
40
Participant Instructions and Consent Form (cont.)
File Sharing Site – Stream  
Definition – Use of websites such as 4Shared, Megaupload, etc. to view content 
via an online video portal 
Repeat viewings? – Yes, unlimited viewings possible with working internet 
connection 
 
Pay TV – Subscription  
Definition – Monthly subscription to pay TV service that provides TV channels not 
available on free-to-air TV such as Foxtel, Austar, Fetch TV, etc.  
Repeat viewings? – No, 1 viewing only, no recording permitted 
 
Pay TV - Pay Per View  
Definition – One-off rental purchase from an online store such as Apple iTunes 
rentals, Foxtel Store, Foxtel Box Office, etc. 
Repeat viewings? – No, 1 viewing only, no copying of file permitted 
 
Attribute Definitions 
 
Picture Quality 
Standard Definition – Baseline quality, standard video resolution    
High Definition – High quality video resolution that shows finer detail than standard 
definition 
Poor Definition – Low quality video resolution that may result in some pixilation of 
video when compared to standard definition 
 
Number of Months Since Film's Worldwide Cinema Release / Number of 
Months Since TV Series' Worldwide Release 
The amount of time (in months) that you would have to wait to watch the film or TV 
series via the chosen viewing option. 
  
% Chance of Being Fined for Watching Without Paying / Fine (in AU$) if 
Caught Watching Without Paying  
Lists the percentage chance of being caught by a copyright infringement agency for 
watching a film or TV series without payment. The fine amount is the subsequent 
punishment given to the viewer if caught.    
Note: only applicable to the ‘File Sharing Site – Stream’ and ‘File Sharing Site – 
Download’ viewing options.     
 
Price Per Film (in AU$) / Price for Entire Series (in AU$) 
Price paid to watch a single film or all episodes of a single TV series.  
Note: for some viewing options this represents a proportion of the total fee paid for 
a service. It is important to note that the price listed does not represent the 
cost of a viewing option as a whole. Instead the price reflects the effective 
‘cost per film’ or ‘cost per TV series’ of that particular service. 
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Figure A1: Film Information Example
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Figure A2: Choice Task Examples
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